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I. INTRODUCTION
There is a common theme between assault rifles, tomahawk axes, bear spray,
zip-tie handcuffs, red Make America Great Again hats, and the Confederate Battle
Flag.1 Rioters possessed these items while participating in the January 6, 2021,
United States Capitol Insurrection.2 The Confederate Army had never breached the
building nor flown their flag at the Capitol; that all changed on that cold January
day in the name of Donald Trump.3 Users on Facebook and Twitter peddled
inaccurate and false information, claiming election fraud; election misinformation
and extremist content led to the death of five people that day.4 The Stop The Steal
movement convinced millions of Americans of massive election misconduct, even
though the claim lacked substantive evidence.5 There is a scourge of false
information on the internet, and social media is at the epicenter.6
Considering the significant role the internet plays in modern life, remarkably,
social media regulation is virtually non-existent in the U.S.7 To date, social media

1. See Cassidy McDonald, Handguns, Crowbars, Tasers and Tomahawk Axes: Dozens of Capitol Rioters
Wielded “Deadly or Dangerous” Weapons, Prosecutors Say, CBS NEWS (May 27, 2021),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/capitol-riot-weapons-deadly-dangerous/ (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review) (describing the multiple firearms, axes, knifes, and pepper spray found on capitol rioters and
reporting criminal investigation findings).
2. McDonald, supra note 1.
3. See Jordan Brasher, The Confederate Battle Flag, Which Rioters Flew Inside the US Capitol, Has Long
Been a Symbol of White Insurrection, CONVERSATION (Jan. 14, 2021), https://theconversation.com/theconfederate-battle-flag-which-rioters-flew-inside-the-us-capitol-has-long-been-a-symbol-of-white-insurrection153071 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (showing a picture of a capitol rioter flying a fullsize confederate flag while walking the halls of the Capitol Building).
4. See Frank Pallone, Jr., Memorandum from Chairman Pallone to the Subcomm. on Commc’n and Tech.
and the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. and Com.: Hearing on Disinformation Nation: Social Media’s Role in
Promoting Extremism and Misinformation Before the H. Comm. On Energy and Com., 117th Cong., 3 (Mar. 22,
2021) (reporting social media’s role in facilitating extreme ideology and how this extremist ideology culminated
into the Capitol Riot).
5. See Marianna Spring, ‘Stop the Steal’: The Deep Roots of Trump’s ‘Voter Fraud’ Strategy, BBC NEWS
(Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-55009950 (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review) (reporting how the spreading of misinformation regarding election fraud in the 2020 election caused
Americans to adopt extremist views); Hyeyon Bastian et al., Data Analytics to Enhance Election Transparency,
MITRE, 25–26 (Feb. 2021), https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/pr-21-0431-data-analytics-toenhance-election-transparency.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (finding no evidence
of voter fraud in the battleground states: Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, or Wisconsin).
6. Pallone, supra note 4, at 1.
7. See JASON GALLO & CLARE CHO, SOCIAL MEDIA: MISINFORMATION AND CONTENT MODERATION
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS CRS REP. NO. 117-R45650, at 4 (Jan. 27, 2021) (reporting seventy-two percent of U.S.
adults use social media and how social media is self-regulating).
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platforms are self-regulating and subject only to their own corporate boards’
oversight to manage user-posted content.8 AB 35 would require social media
platforms to disclose whether they have a policy or mechanism in place to address
false information.9 AB 35 imposes no material change in how social media
platforms handle disinformation, nor does it require platforms to adopt a policy
stopping false information.10 AB 35 is a step in the right direction, as it seeks to
tackle the proliferation of false information; however, AB 35 will likely not be
effective.11 Moreover, the California State Legislature cannot solve a national
problem, as the most comprehensive solution would require establishing a new
federal agency to regulate the internet.12
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Social media is largely self-regulating and does not face the same scrutiny as
broadcast media.13 Reviewing print and broadcast media regulatory history helps
explain why the U.S. needs an alternative way to regulate the internet and social
media.14 Section A discusses FCC v. Pacifica Foundation and its influence on print
and broadcast media regulation.15 Section B examines internet regulation in the
U.S.16
A. The Media of Yester-Year and Its Regulatory Model
The need to simultaneously protect and control media poses challenges for
legislatures to navigate.17 The legislature must balance the constitutionally
protected freedom of speech with necessary protective measures, ensuring citizens

8. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2021) (deferring content regulation to social media platforms); see also Tawanna
Lee, Combating Fake News with “Reasonable Standards,” 43 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 81, 88–89 (2021)
(describing the issues of social media self-regulation).
9. AB 35, 2021 Leg., 2021–2022 Sess. (Cal. 2021) (as amended on July 1, 2021, but not enacted).
10. See id. (providing that a social media platform must disclose whether there is a mechanism to address
the spread of misinformation, but does not show any material change on how social media platforms nor require
adopting a policy against misinformation).
11. Id.
12. See id. (proposing a state law that only pertains to California, which is not binding on a national level);
see infra Section III.
13. See Mark Caramanica, Internet-Television, Peer-to-Peer Technology and Free Speech: Lessons from
Web 1.0, 20 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 295, 312, 314, 322 (Aug. 2009) (describing the differences in regulation
standards between print, broadcast, and online media).
14. See id. at 322 (explaining the issues in applying broadcast media regulation standards to internet
regulation).
15. Infra Section II.A.
16. Infra Section II.B.
17. See Rick Morris, The Futility of Regulating Social Media Content in a Global Media Environment, 2
NOTRE DAME J. EMERGING TECH. 57, 66 (2021) (detailing how certain internet regulations have failed); Daniela
Manzi, Managing the Misinformation Marketplace: The First Amendment and the Fight Against Fake News, 87
FORDHAM L. REV. 2623, 2633 (2019).
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are free from harmful speech.18 As communication methods evolve, this balancing
act becomes more complex.19 Subsection 1 details print media and broadcast media
regulation.20 Subsection 2 examines FCC v. Pacifica and its impact on broadcast
media.21
1. Print Media and Broadcast Media Regulation
There is no government agency responsible for regulating print media, and
generally, the press is self-regulating.22 However, this does not mean the press can
publish indiscriminately: libel laws prevent anyone—including the press—from
publishing defamatory material.23 Generally, if a print media outlet knowingly
publishes false information about an individual, that outlet could face a lawsuit
based in a libel claim for damages.24 Libel laws apply to the information source
and usually not to the information distributors.25 Thus, a newspaper printing a
defamatory statement would be subject to a libel suit, while the newsstand or
bookseller distributing the newspaper generally would not be.26
The Federal Communications Committee (“FCC”) evolved during the 1930s
through a sequence of acts into the agency we know today that manages and
oversees broadcast media.27 At its inception, the FCC’s purpose included ensuring
the availability of interstate wire commerce communication to all citizens.28
Eventually, the agency’s regulatory power expanded to the content television
networks broadcasted.29 For example, the FCC forbids broadcasting obscene
material and limits the broadcast of indecent material and profanity, particularly
for content children are likely to see.30
18. Manzi, supra note 17, at 2633.
19. Morris, supra note 17, at 69.
20. Infra Subsection II.A.1.
21. Infra Subsection II.A.2.
22. Caramanica, supra note 13, at 322.
23. See E. Alex Murcia, Developments in the Law: Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act: Why
California Courts Interpreted It Correctly and What That Says About How We Should Change It, 54 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 235, 239 (2020) (explaining how print media is regulated and the liability imposed on publishers and
distributors); CAL. CIV. CODE § 45 (West 2021) (“Libel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing,
printing, picture . . . , which exposes any person to hatred, contempt . . . , or which causes him to be shunned or
avoided, or which . . . injure[s] him in his occupation.”).
24. Murcia, supra note 23, at 239.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Daniel Ernst, Article: The Shallow State: The Federal Communications Commission and the New Deal,
4 U. PA. J.L. & PUB. AFF. 403, 408 (2019).
28. See Catherine Schwarze, Note, We Want Wifi: The FCC’s Intervention in Municipal Broadband
Networks, 56 WASH U. J.L. & POL’Y 199, 201 (2018) (summarizing the FCC’s history); 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2021).
29. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2021); Telecommunications Act of 1996 (2021) [hereinafter 1996 Act]; see
Obscenity, Indecency, and Profanity, FTC (last visited June 13, 2021), https://www.fcc.gov/general/obscenityindecency-and-profanity (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (defining obscenity as illegal
content, such as child pornography).
30. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2021); 1996 Act; see Obscenity, Indecency, and Profanity, supra note 29 (describing

254

University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 53
2. FCC v. Pacifica Found, Big Brother Protecting its Citizens from Filthy
Language
In 1973, a radio station aired a portion of George Carlin’s comedy routine
“Filthy Words” as part of a commentary piece on society’s attitude about
profanity.31 The FCC then reprimanded Pacifica—the owner of the station—for
violating broadcasting regulations that prohibit airing indecent material.32 When
the adjudication went to trial, the Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s actions.33 In
his opinion, Justice Stevens articulated why the courts impose a higher standard
upon broadcast media compared to print media.34
Print media can be self-regulating because it is not intrusive in the way
broadcast media is.35 To obtain print media, one must leave their home and seek it
out; to avoid it, a person can simply look away and not read it.36 However, with
broadcast media it is present in the household, and the viewer cannot control the
information presented to them—exposing them to viewing unexpected content.37
For example, if a reader begins to read indecent material, a reader can quickly
recognize its nature and stop reading almost immediately.38 Whereas, when a
broadcast viewer sees indecent material, it is unlikely they had any warning; once
they recognize the content, they have already viewed it.39
The Court also reasoned that children are especially vulnerable to broadcast
media, as they can easily hear and view indecent content without parental
approval.40 As the source of print media is usually at a bookstore or outside of the
home, it is easier to restrict a child’s access to indecent print material.41 However,
broadcast media is accessible to children in their own homes, where children may
face accidental exposure to age-inappropriate content before a parent could
intervene.42 Therefore, the Court justified regulating broadcast media over freedom
of speech in the interest of youth’s wellbeing and parental right to control what
content their children witness.43

federal prohibitions on the broadcasting of indecent or profane material during certain times).
31. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 729–730 (1978).
32. Id. at 730–731.
33. Id. at 750–751.
34. Id. at 748.
35. See id. at 748–749 (discussing that broadcast media cannot be easily tuned out by the listener and is
uniquely accessible to children).
36. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 748–749.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 749–750.
40. Id.
41. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 749–750.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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B. Cyberspace Regulation in the U.S.
Like the regulation of broadcast media, regulatory oversight of the internet has
gone through different phases and refinements in its legislative history.44 In the
internet law’s early stages, the legislation unsuccessfully used broadcast media
models for internet media regulation.45 Subsection 1 discusses the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”).46 Subsection 2 details the CDA
§ 230 (“Section 230”) and its role in current internet regulation.47
1. Reno v. ACLU, When Internet Regulation Goes Too Far
Congress enacted the CDA as Title V of the Telecommunications Decency Act
of 1996 (“the 1996 Act”) with protecting children in mind.48 The CDA prohibited
anyone from knowingly transmitting or displaying indecent or obscene material to
anyone under eighteen years old.49 The CDA contained an open provision
requiring providers to employ a costly mechanism to verify a user’s age; providers
out of compliance faced prosecution.50
After Congress enacted the CDA, the American Civil Liberties Union
(“ACLU”) sued the government, complaining the CDA unconstitutionally
restricted free speech.51 Reno v. ACLU held internet content more closely
correlated with traditional publishing, not broadcast media.52 The internet, like
traditional publishing, requires the user to seek specific content.53 Since the
internet requires an active search for content instead of passive observation from
broadcast media, it is less likely minors could accidentally stumble across indecent
material.54 Therefore, the government may not regulate indecent speech on the
internet.55 However, since the First Amendment does not extend to obscene speech,
the government may regulate this type of content.56
44. Stephen Shapiro, One and the Same: How Internet Non-Regulation Undermines the Rationales Used
to Support Broadcast Regulation, 8 MEDIA L. & POL’Y 1, 7–8 (1999); infra Subsection II.A.2.
45. Shapiro, supra note 44, at 11–12 (1999).
46. Infra Subsection II.B.1.
47. Infra Subsection II.B.2.
48. Murcia, supra note 23, at 242; 47 U.S.C.A. § 223 (2021); 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2021).
49.
Sarah Zeigler, Communications Decency Act of 1996 (1996), MSTU (2009),
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1070/communications-decency-act-of-1996 (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review).
50. Id.
51. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871–72 (1997).
52. See id. at 869–870 (disagreeing with the government’s argument of Pacifica upholding the CDA’s
regulation in the interest of protecting children from indecent/obscene material).
53. Id. at 869–870.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 875 (showing that though Congress has a special interest in protecting children
from harmful content, that interest does not justify an oppressive suppression of speech intended for adults); see
also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20–21 (1973) (holding that Congress may regulate obscene speech).
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2. The Section 230 and the Modern Self-Regulatory Internet
As Justice Stevens discusses in Reno, social media platforms are more akin to
print media, and therefore their regulations are too.57 Though most of the CDA is
defunct, Section 230 is an active federal law that codifies this similarity between
social and print media.58 Section 230 protects social media platforms from liability
for the illegal content posted to their platforms, so long as they make a good-faith
effort to remove illegal content.59 Section 230 also protects social media platforms
from prosecution for discrimination when they prevent postings, screen offensive
and illegal content, or block users posting such material.60
Just as newsstand owners are not liable for defamatory items in the newspapers
they sell, social media platforms are not liable for defamatory items their users
post.61 Individuals may sue under libel laws if someone defames them on a social
media platform.62 However, these defamed individuals cannot sue the platform—
only those who posted the defamatory content.63 Thus, the current law against
liability hinders government oversight and creates a self-regulating system.64
Social media platforms may take suggestions to government requests, but those
suggestions are not binding.65
III. AB 35
Assembly Member Chau introduced AB 35 to address the spread of false
information on social media.66 AB 35 requires that a social media platform disclose
whether or not the site has a policy or mechanism to address the spread of
misinformation.67 Nevertheless, AB 35 does not require that a social media
platform adopt policies that address false information.68 Instead, a social media
platform that discloses that it does nothing to address misinformation would
comply with the law.69 The disclosure needs to be easily accessible on the

57. Caramanica, supra note 13, at 322; Reno, 521 U.S. at 870.
58. See Caramanica, supra note 13, at 322 (explaining how the internet is self-regulating, much like print
media); see also Murcia, supra note 23, at 239–244 (detailing how the CDA § 230 is still active law).
59. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2021).
60. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2021).
61. Murcia, supra note 23, at 243–44.
62. Id. at 244–45.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 256.
65. See Lee, supra note 8, at 100–101 (highlighting how government requests for platforms to take down
content are frequently ignored).
66. ASSEMBLY FLOOR ANALYSIS, ASSEMBLY THIRD READING ON AB 35, at 2 (May 24, 2021).
67. AB 35, 2021 Leg., 2021–2022 Sess. (Cal. 2021) (as amended on July 1, 2021, but not enacted).
68. ASSEMBLY FLOOR ANALYSIS, ASSEMBLY THIRD READING ON AB 35, at 2 (May 24, 2021).
69. See id. at 2 (explaining that a disclosure that discloses the platform does nothing would comply, as the
user is informed that the site provides dubious information).
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platform’s internet website and its mobile application.70 Failure to comply with the
regulation will result in a $5,000 fine for the first violation.71 A second violation
results in a $10,000 fine, and all subsequent violations will result in a $20,000
fine.72
The disclosure must state what the platform does to address three practices.73
First, it must disclose how the platform reduces the spread of misinformation that
contributes to the risk of imminent violence or physical harm.74 Second, the
platform must state how it works to reduce the spread of harmful, verifiably
inauthentic content.75 Third, the platform must disclose how it quells practices
intended to deceptively and substantially manipulate or disrupt the behavior of
users on social media.76
AB 35 only applies to social media platforms that generate over $100,000,000
in gross revenue in the previous calendar year, excluding other internet sites and
services.77 AB 35 specifically excludes instant messaging, comment sections on an
online news site, and streaming services strictly used to consume licensed
media.78AB 35 limits its jurisdiction to sites where users create a profile
specifically to interact with the site’s services.79 Said users must be able to build
connections with other users, like a friend list or followers.80 Finally, the ability to
view and navigate a list of the user’s connections and the capability for user-made
connections between other users within the system must be present.81
IV. ANALYSIS
Based upon the explosion of proposed national and state legislation in this
area, it seems evident that legislators and their constituencies believe selfregulation is not working.82 AB 35 is one of the proposed legislative efforts, but its
plan will not be effective.83 Section A explains how current law exacerbates the

70. AB 35, 2021 Leg., 2021–2022 Sess. (Cal. 2021) (as amended on July 1, 2021, but not enacted).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See id. (referring to content that uses misinformation to incite riots or violence against a particular
demographic).
75. See AB 35, 2021 Leg., 2021–22 Sess. (Cal. 2021) (as amended on July 1, but not enacted) (referring
to content that promotes dangerous conspiracy theories, such as COVID being a hoax).
76. See id. (referring to misinformation designed to cause societal destabilization).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. AB 35, 2021 Leg., 2021–2022 Sess. (Cal. 2021) (as amended on Jul. 1, 2021, but not enacted).
81. See id. (allowing individuals to “[v]iew and navigate a list of other users’ individual connections.”).
82. See Pallone, supra note 4, at 4 (detailing how social media platforms have spread false information and
employ ineffective measures to control its spread); see also GALLO & CHO, supra note 7, at 27–29 (compiling the
116th Congress’ proposed legislation regarding CDA 230).
83. AB 35, 2021 Leg., 2021–2022 Sess. (Cal. 2021) (as amended on Jul. 1, 2021, but not enacted).
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false information crisis.84 Section B details AB 35’s shortcomings.85 Finally,
section C proposes a solution in the form of a new federal agency.86
A. False Information is Tearing the U.S. Apart, as Social Media Platforms Rake
in Profit
The prevalence of false information on the internet has created serious social
issues and undermines legitimate expertise and authority of institutions.87 When
confronted with the devastating impact disinformation generates, social media
companies are free to use ineffective solutions.88 Subsection 1 posits how current
law allows false information to infiltrate and harm the U.S.89 Subsection 2 explains
how social media platforms have failed to protect the world from their
shortcomings.90
1. Russians and Pandemics and Riots, Oh My! How Current Law Harms the
U.S.
In the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, Russian intelligence agencies conducted
social media operations, promoting inaccurate and derogatory information to sway
the election in favor of Donald Trump.91 Unfortunately, social media platforms
discovered Russian interference after the damage occurred.92 Had Section 230
required government oversight and not deferred monitoring responsibility to social
media businesses, they may have caught the Russian interference earlier and
prevented its’ impact.93 Government monitoring could be more effective than
84. Infra Section IV.A.
85. Infra Section IV.B.
86. Infra Section IV.C.
87. Lee, supra note 8, at 82.
88. AB 35, 2021 Leg., 2021–2022 Sess. (Cal. 2021) (as amended on Jul. 1, 2021, but not enacted).
89. Infra Subsection IV.A.1.
90. Infra Subsection IV.A.2.
91. See Robert S. Mueller, Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential
Election,
Vol.
I,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
JUST.,
22–24
(Mar.
2019),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/sco/file/1373816/download (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review) (exposing Russian troll farm operations began creating fake accounts and activism groups designed to
divide and stir turmoil in the already bipartisan political climate); see id.at 22–24 (detailing how Russian
operations created fake groups, such as Muslims for Clinton, preyed on American fears of a Muslim takeover);
see also Mike Snider, Robert Mueller Investigation: What is a Russian Troll Farm?, USA TODAY, (Feb. 16,
2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2018/02/16/robert-mueller-investigation-what-russian-trollfarm/346159002/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (defining “troll farm” as an organized
user group, whom work together to create online traffic, swaying public opinion and spreading disinformation).
92. See Sheera Frenkel & Katie Benner, To Stir Discord in 2016, Russians Turned Most Often to Facebook,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/17/technology/indictment-russian-techfacebook.html (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting how Mark Zuckerberg dismissed
election interference concerns when interference suspicions first arose in 2016).
93. GALLO & CHO, supra note 7, at 6; see Frenkel & Benner, supra note 92 (asking why Facebook did not
catch the Russian interference earlier).
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social media monitoring because social media companies are concerned with
profit, not foreign interference.94
Facebook, Twitter, and Google’s social media platforms have aided the spread
of COVID misinformation.95 COVID misinformation caused or contributed to
hundreds of deaths and thousands of injuries in the U.S.96 Again, Section 230’s
self-regulatory system allows social media companies focus on profits over
safety.97 Facebook concerns itself with business profitability, and the current law
allows it to ignore how the platform contributes to mass death in the U.S.98
Misinformation regarding election fraud in 2020 spread extensively through
social media.99 The Stop the Steal movement fulminated on Facebook, and both
private and public Facebook groups planned the Capitol Insurrection.100 The U.S.’s
fate was left to social media’s mercy, as the current internet regulation law entrusts
social media platforms with monitoring responsibilities.101 It is doubtful
government monitoring would allow public Facebook groups to plan an
insurrection.102
2. Social Media Platforms, Failing to Self-Regulate
Congress has entrusted internet conglomerates self-regulatory power.103
However, since false information runs rampant on social media platforms, internet

94. See Rebecca Heilweil, At Least One Member of Congress Thinks We Need a Government Agency to
Regulate Social Media Companies, VOX (Mar. 25, 2021), https://www.vox.com/recode/22351100/congresspeter-welch-facebook-twitter-google-youtube-social-media-agency (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review) (reporting how a new federal agency could standardize monitoring practices and oversee social media
practices); see also Frenkel & Benner, supra note 92 (detailing how Facebook has refused “outside researchers
to examine the data on how Russia used the platform so effectively”); Queenie Wong, Facebook Warns of Slower
Revenue
Growth
Amid
Fight
Against
Fake
News,
CNET
(July
28,
2021),
https://www.cnet.com/tech/mobile/facebook-warns-of-slower-revenue-growth-amid-fight-against-fake-news/
(on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
95. Pallone, supra note 4, at 2; see Md Saiful Islam et al., COVID-19–Related Infodemic and Its Impact
on Public Health: A Global Social Media Analysis, 103 AM. J. TROPICAL MED. & HYGIENE 1621, 1622–1624
(2020) (detailing how users circulated stories claiming COVID was a hoax, lies about the virus’ origin, and
vaccine safety inaccuracies).
96. See Islam et al., supra note 95, at 1624 (detailing how over 800 Iranians died after drinking pure ethanol
due to misinformation on COVID cures).
97. GALLO & CHO, supra note 7, at 9.
98. Wong, supra note 94; GALLO & CHO, supra note 7, at 9.
99. Spring, supra note 5.
100. Rob Kuznia et al., Stop the Steal’s Massive Disinformation Campaign Connected to Roger Stone,
CNN (Nov. 14, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/13/business/stop-the-steal-disinformation-campaigninvs/index.html (on file with the University of the Pacific Law review); see Pallone, supra note 4, at 2 (reporting
how Sympathizers posted and shared false information about fraudulent voting practices, dysfunctional and
biased voting software, and dead voters with millions of people across the globe).
101. GALLO & CHO, supra note 7, at 18.
102. See Heilweil, supra note 94 (reporting that the “enthusiasm to crack down on these platforms remains
strong”).
103. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2021); Lee, supra note 9, at 89.
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conglomerates have failed to self-regulate.104 Under self-regulation, social media
platforms are not doing enough to combat misinformation; COVID
misinformation’s prevalence demonstrates this ineptitude.105 As of March 26,
2021, the twelve accounts responsible for sixty-five percent of vaccine
misinformation on the internet were still active, and no platforms have suspended
these accounts.106
However, while this is not to say that social media platforms have done
nothing, their efforts are often too little, too late.107 Facebook reportedly has
removed over twelve million pieces of COVID misinformation and has since
begun threatening to ban users and groups that repeatedly spread
misinformation.108 YouTube began removing videos containing COVID vaccine
misinformation in October 2020.109 Twitter began labeling COVID vaccine
misinformation at an even later date, in December 2020.110 However, these efforts
are ineffective because, specifically when it comes to COVID, misinformation
continues to thrive on these social media platforms.111
Numerous studies have shown that social media platforms’ algorithms actively
promote divisive, hateful, and extremist content as they engage more users.112
Social media platforms have not prioritized fixing their algorithms’ problems
because it is more profitable not to.113 False information’s nature is scandalous and

104. Pallone, supra note 4, at 4.
105.
The
Disinformation
Dozen,
CCDH,
5
(Mar.
24,
2021),
https://www.congress.gov/117/meeting/house/111407/documents/HHRG-117-IF16-20210325-SD017.pdf (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting twelve accounts across Facebook, Twitter, and
Instagram are responsible for sixty-five percent of COVID vaccine disinformation); Transcript: Hearing on
Disinformation Nation: Social Media’s Role in Promoting Extremism and Misinformation Before the H. Comm.
Energy & Com., 117th Cong. (Mar. 25, 2021) (questioning why social media CEOs have yet to take down the
disinformation dozen).
106. See Transcript: Hearing on Disinformation Nation, supra note 105 (demanding that the CEOs take
action and remove the disinformation dozen).
107. See Kari Paul, Here Are All the Steps Social Media Made to Combat Misinformation, GUARDIAN
(Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/oct/29/here-are-all-the-steps-social-mediamade-to-combat-misinformation-will-it-be-enough (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(reporting on the inefficient steps social media has taken to counter misinformation).
108. See Testimony of Mark Zuckerberg Facebook, Inc.: Hearing on Disinformation Nation: Social
Media’s Role in Promoting Extremism and Misinformation Before the H. Comm. Energy & Com., 117th Cong.
(Mar. 25, 2021) (defending Facebook’s efforts on countering misinformation).
109. Pallone, supra note 4, at 3.
110. Id. at 4.
111. The Disinformation Dozen, supra note 105, at 5; GALLO & CHO, supra note 7, at 16.
112. See GALLO & CHO, supra note 7, at 27–29 (defining algorithm as a computer program designed to
filter and promote content to the user based on the user’s interaction with similar content). See generally id. at 10
(reporting how social media platforms are the only entities privy to the exact mechanisms of how the algorithms
function, and they hide the exact nature from the public).
113. See Karen Hao, How Facebook Got Addicted to Spreading Misinformation, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar.
11, 2021), https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/03/11/1020600/facebook-responsible-ai-misinformation/
(on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (exposing how Facebook sold out the American people
for profit while aware of the false information its algorithm’s peddled).
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inflammatory, making it alluring and interesting to the user.114 As false information
creates the most user engagement, addressing the issue would hurt the platform’s
profit margin because maximizing engagement maximizes profit.115
Facebook has known that its algorithm amplifies misinformation for years;
however, it has never made addressing the issue a priority.116 For example,
Facebook waited until October 2020 to change its algorithm to address election
misinformation.117 Had it done so earlier, it could have prevented over ten billion
views regarding election misinformation.118 Although Facebook claims to have
done “serious work” to address the platform’s misinformation issue, its part in the
Capitol Riot reinforces its effort is inadequate.119
B. AB 35, A Step Forward, but A Step Too Small
While addressing false information on the internet is a noble effort, AB 35
does not propose effective solutions.120 A disclosure detailing whether the platform
has a policy addressing false information will do little to stop misinformation from
spreading on the internet.121 Subsection 1 explains how AB 35 proposes no
material change and how the disclosure will provide no new information.122
Subsection 2 discusses why AB 35 will not be effective and provides methods that
would deter false information.123
1. AB 35, Seeking Accountability by Requiring Minimal Changes
Assembly Member Chau believes AB 35 “is a significant step in establishing
levels of transparency and accountability to better assess what social media
platforms are [doing] to address . . . . . . misinformation.”124 AB 35 seems to be
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.; Transcript: Hearing on Disinformation Nation, supra note 105.
117.
Facebook:
From
Election
to
Insurrection,
AVAAZ
(Mar.
18,
2021),
https://secure.avaaz.org/campaign/en/facebook_election_insurrection/ (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review).
118. See id. (detailing how Facebook has failed its countrymen and continued to allow misinformation to
spread).
119. See Transcript: Hearing on Disinformation Nation, supra note 105 (transcribing Zuckerberg’s
testimony, where he defends his company’s methods of addressing false information).
120. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS ON AB 35, at 7–8 (July 1, 2021).
121. Id.; see Sara Brown, MIT Sloan Research About Social Media, Misinformation, and Elections, MIT
SLOAN (Oct. 5, 2020), https://mitsloan.mit.edu/ideas-made-to-matter/mit-sloan-research-about-social-mediamisinformation-and-elections (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (detailing proactive
measures that can fight false information spreading, none which include providing disclosures).
122. Infra Subsection IV.B.1.
123. Infra Subsection IV.B.2.
124. Letter from Edwin Chau, Assembly Member, Cal. State Assembly, to Erica OConnell, Staff Writer,
University of the Pacific Law Review, Greensheets (Aug. 3, 2021) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review).
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tackling false information as if it were solely a lack of transparency in a platform’s
mechanisms.125 However, the issue does not stem from social media platforms
failing to properly disclose their policies; the problem is their failure to control
user-posted content spreading misinformation.126 Since this bill does not require
social media platforms to change how they control content, false information will
still spread.127
AB 35’s purpose is to provide users and policymakers more information about
what social media platforms specifically do to combat false information.128
Perhaps AB 35 would allow policymakers to gather information and research
which content-control mechanism is most effective.129 However, the majority
already have disclosures imparting that information.130 Assembly Member Chau
states AB 35 will “align standards” and provide a “guarantee “that emerging
platforms will make such disclosures.”131 Maybe AB 35 will fill the gaps some
social media platforms leave in their current disclosures.132 However, besides
transparency, Assembly Member Chau is unclear what purpose the disclosed
information serves and how the California Legislature will proceed after the
platforms inform the public.133
2. A Passive Bill for an Issue Needing a Proactive Solution.
Assembly Member Chau states misinformation results in “real harm” and
acknowledges addressing its spread on social media is important.134 Assembly
Member Chau wants social media platforms to disclose “whether or not they are
making any effort to address the spread of misinformation,” with the ultimate goal
of holding social media platforms accountable.135 However, a platform disclosing
it has no policy in place complies with AB 35, making it unclear how AB 35 holds
platforms accountable for not addressing false information.136
125. See AB 35, 2021 Leg., 2021–22 Sess. (Cal. 2021) (as amended on July 1, 2021, but not enacted)
(relying on existing law forbidding false advertisement on internet services); SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE,
COMMITTEE ANALYSIS ON AB 35, at 2 (July 1, 2021).
126. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS ON AB 35, at 5, 7–8 (July 1, 2021).
127. Id. at 8.
128. Id. at 5.
129. Id.
130.
Fact Checking on Facebook, FACEBOOK (last visited on Jul. 17, 2021),
https://www.facebook.com/business/help/2593586717571940?id=673052479947730 (on file with the University
of the Pacific Law Review); Synthetic and Manipulated Media Policy, TWITTER (last visited on Jul. 17, 2021),
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/manipulated-media (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review).
131. Letter from Edwin Chau, supra note 124.
132. Fact Checking on Facebook, supra note 130; Synthetic and Manipulated Media Policy, supra note
130.
133. Letter from Edwin Chau, supra note 124.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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Requiring a disclosure, which most platforms already provide, will not stop
misinformation from spreading.137 Addressing false information requires proactive
solutions.138 Studies have found that labeling information as false will help to cull
the spread.139 Creating more advanced algorithms to help identify misinformation
can help address the issue.140 Platforms can also prevent posts from entering into
algorithms until their employees fact-check the post.141 These are all proactive
solutions that can help prevent the spread of false information; however, social
media platforms may choose other, less effective methods.142
C. A New Federal Agency for Modern Internet
A national problem requires a national solution.143 Subsection 1 explains the
issues with Section 230 and why amending it will not be enough to stop false
information.144 Subsection 2 explains why social media requires innovative
legislation.145 Subsection 3 explores why private entities should not have
unfettered control.146 Finally, subsection 4 proposes a new federal agency to
regulate the internet and social media.147

137. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS ON AB 35, at 7–8 (Jul. 1, 2021).
138.
Paul
Barrett,
Tackling
Domestic
Misinformation,
NYU
(Mar.
2019),
https://issuu.com/nyusterncenterforbusinessandhumanri/docs/nyu_domestic_disinformation_digital?e=3164082
7/68184927 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review); Chris Fox, Social Media: How Might it Be
Regulated, BBC (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-54901083 (on file with the University
of the Pacific Law Review).
139.
Fighting
Fake
News
Workshop
Report,
YALE
LAW,
12
(2018),
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/isp/documents/fighting_fake_news_-_workshop_report.pdf
(on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review); contra Gordon Pennycook Et. Al., The Implied Truth
Affect: Attaching Warnings to a Subset of Fake News Headlines Increases Perceived Accuracy of Headlines
Without Warnings, 66 MGMT. SCI. 4944, 4945 (2020) (showing how the labeling method can backfire, as failure
to label the false information quickly may cause viewers to assume the information is true before fact-checkers
label the information).
140. See Fighting Fake News Workshop Report, supra note 139, at 13 (listing methods that are effective
in combatting false information).
141. See Jeff Roberts, Facebook’s New Tool to Stop Fake News is a Game Changer – If Only the Company
Would Only Use It, FORTUNE (Oct. 18, 2020), https://fortune.com/2020/10/18/facebook-tool-stop-fake-newsviral-content-review-system-fb-business-model/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (showing
how FB has found solutions, such as the “circuit breaker” to limit false information, but and chose not to use
them).
142. See id. (revealing that FB may avoid more effective methods because those methods can result in less
profits).
143. See Heilweil, supra note 94 (reporting how a federal agency could be a solution to the false
information infodemic).
144. Infra Subsection IV.C.1.
145. Infra Subsection IV.C.2.
146. Infra Subsection IV.C.3.
147. Infra Subsection IV.C.4.
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1. Amending Section 230 is Putting a Band-Aid on a Gaping Wound
Section 230 protects online platforms from liability as publishers or speakers
of user content.148 This treatment is the best of both worlds: they are not liable for
failing to remove unlawful content nor for removing lawful content.149 Section 230
provides no direction or procedures for managing user-posted content on an online
platform, and social media platforms may act at their discretion.150 This lack of
oversight gives social media platforms little incentive to actively address major
user-posted content issues.151 The pressure to maximize profits and lack of
motivation to be proactive may be why social media platforms wait until public
outcry to change.152
There has been a stir in Washington D.C., seeking to amend Section 230.153
The Legislature is attempting to lift the liability protections for user-posted content
that Section 230 affords social media platforms.154 For example, many of these
bills propose to require social media platforms to implement more stringent
policies and mechanisms addressing false information.155 Thus, the platform’s
failure to act promptly would leave the platform open to legal ramifications.156
This type of amendment may lead to a greater incentive for online platforms
to address false information.157 However, according to the CEOs of the major
social media platforms, their companies allegedly work tirelessly in stopping the
spread of misinformation.158 Nevertheless, these companies put forth the image
that they cannot create a solution to this global problem.159 If so, then perhaps more
action is needed than just an amendment to Section 230; perhaps more extensive
and innovative regulation is necessary.160

148. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2021); see Rebecca Hamilton, Governing the Global Public Square, 62 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 117, 132 (2021) (describing the dual protections social media is given).
149. Hamilton, supra note 148, at 132 (2021); 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2021).
150. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2021); Justice Department Issues Recommendations for Section 230 Reform, DEP’T
OF JUST. (June 17, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-issues-recommendations-section230-reform (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
151. Justice Department Issues Recommendations for Section 230 Reform, supra note 150.
152. Id.; Hao, supra note 113.
153. Justice Department Issues Recommendations for Section 230 Reform, supra note 150.
154. GALLO & CHO, supra note 7, at 27–29.
155. Id.
156. Justice Department Issues Recommendations for Section 230 Reform, supra note 150.
157. Id.
158. Transcript: Hearing on Disinformation Nation, supra note 105.
159. Id.
160. Heilweil, supra note 94; Transcript: Hearing on Disinformation Nation, supra note 105.
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2. Emergence of New Media Requires Innovation
Social media and print media are vastly different and should not use similar
self-regulatory systems.161 Print media does not have mechanisms to automatically
distribute information, and print media does not have billions of sources.162 It is
much easier to track down and prosecute a publisher in print media than the
millions of fake online accounts publishing false information.163 Such differences
make self-regulation possible for print media and irresponsible for social media,
especially considering how these platforms profit from false information
dissemination.164
As Reno demonstrates, trying to implement broadcast media regulations to
control the content on the internet is like trying to insert a square peg into a round
hole.165 It does not quite fit.166 The content on social media has billions of sources,
making it impossible to impose the same standard of regulation that controls
television or radio.167 When the Legislature attempts to use broadcast media
models as a basis for innovative internet law, as Reno demonstrates, questions of
Constitutionality inevitably come to the forefront.168 Justice Steven’s opinion holds
the internet as a different entity than broadcast media.169 Perhaps it is time to stop
modeling internet legislation on existing print and broadcast regulations and begin
a new structure tailored to the internet’s distinct characteristics.170
Like broadcast media did at its inception in the 1930s, social media presents
new problems that require new solutions.171 The FCC’s formation did not happen
overnight; the agency’s evolution went through many changes and alterations in

161. Hamilton, supra note 148, at 132; 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2021).
162. See Twyla Cummings et al., Print Media Distribution: Process, Profitability, and Challenges, RIT
SCHOLAR WORKS (2006), https://scholarworks.rit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1047&context=books (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting how print media is distributed); see also Murcia, supra
note 23, at 238–239 (showing how modern print media sources are considered publishers, thus subject to libel
laws when posing to online sources).
163. Hamilton, supra note 148, at 131; 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2021).
164. Hamilton, supra note 148, at 131 (2021); 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2021).
165. Shapiro, supra note 44, at 11–12; see Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 867–871 (1997) (showing how
using broadcast media regulatory models raises serious Constitutional questions).
166. Reno, 521 U.S. at 867–871; Shapiro, supra note 44, at 11–12.
167. See Brian Dean, Social Network Usage & Growth Statistics: How Many People Use Social Media in
2021?, BLACKLINKO (Updated Apr. 26, 2021), https://backlinko.com/social-media-users (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting that more than 4 billion internet users are active on social media,
and as users, they are privileged to post content); see also Caramanica, supra note 13, at 312 (describing the
regulation standards differences between print, broadcast, and online media).
168. Reno, 521 U.S. at 867–871.
169. Id.
170. Shapiro, supra note 44, at 12; 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2021).
171. Morris, supra note 17, at 63–71; see Stephen Smith, Radio: The Internet of the 1930s, APM REPS.
(Nov. 10, 2014), https://www.apmreports.org/episode/2014/11/10/radio-the-internet-of-the-1930s (on file with
the University of the Pacific Law Review) (highlighting that while broadcasting began in the 1920s, American
households began owning radios during the 1930s).
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its legislative history.172 Despite its shortcomings, the FCC’s jurisdiction over
broadcast media gives regulatory power to a public entity to enact policy when
societal challenges arise.173 Social media has presented more societal problems
than broadcast media ever has, making it more dangerous.174 It is illogical to justify
federally regulating broadcast media and not social media, considering social
media’s power over society.175
The opposition against social media regulation argues that said regulation is
unconstitutional, as it abridges freedom of speech.176 However, freedom of speech
is not boundless; there are limits to its protections.177 For example, some of the
false information previously discussed is defamatory, libelous, or both; generally,
the First Amendment does not protect these types of speech.178 Therefore,
regulating some social media content would not infringe upon First Amendment
rights.179
3. Answer to the People, Not Stockholders
Facebook chose to maximize profits over fixing some of its algorithms’
issues.180 As social media is a for-profit business, the goal of these platforms is to
maximize profits.181 Unless regulated to do so, social media companies would not
willingly implement policies that are not in their financial interest.182 Facebook,
Twitter, and Google were aware of their algorithms’ issues, yet they waited until
after public outcry to address these issues.183 History shows corporations
repeatedly choosing profits over the public interest and requiring government
intervention to safeguard the public’s wellbeing.184 This historical pattern shows
that social media companies will likely not change without government
interference.185
172. Morris, supra note 17, at 63–71.
173. Id.
174. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–750 (1978) (showing that broadcast media’s major
danger is children being exposed to foul language).
175. Shapiro, supra note 44, at 18 (1999); 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2021).
176. See Manzi, supra note 17, at 2645 (explaining the controversy in regulating internet speech).
177. See id. at 2637–38 (detailing how the Supreme Court upheld limiting speech to protect children and
to protect citizens from baseless defamation).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Hao, supra note 113.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See Transcript: Hearing on Disinformation Nation, supra note 105 (“Your algorithms make it
possible to supercharge these kinds of opinions. I think we are here because of what these platforms enabled, how
your choices put out lives and our democracy at risk.”).
184. See Thomas Earl Geu & Martha Davis, A Legal Analysis in the Context of the Changing Transnational
Political Economy, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1679, 1691–1692 (1995) (detailing how businesses created dangerous and
exploitative work conditions, which required passing labor laws to force businesses to protect their employees).
185. Roberts, supra note 141; Geu & Davis, supra note 184, at 1692.
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Another problem with continuing the current self-regulating system is that this
will give social media platforms the power to decide what is or is not true.186 Selfregulation entrusts social media platforms to monitor and remove false
information; the companies’ decisions, which are catered to their own biases and
agendas, establishes whether the information is false.187 Social media platforms
may begin censoring posts critical of their businesses, posts that hurt their profits,
or posts opposing their political agendas.188 Additionally, social media platforms
may be so fearful of liability that they will over-censor and stifle much political
discourse simply because it is possibly untrue.189 Perhaps this is too much power
for an unelected organization.190 Left to self-regulate, platforms have too much
private interest at stake and too much influence over society.191
4. A Modern Agency for the Modern Information Age
Representative Peter Welch directly asked the CEOs of Facebook, Twitter, and
Google whether they would be open to creating a new federal agency responsible
for the internet.192 All three CEOs admit that their industry could benefit from more
legislative direction in regulating social media.193 Google’s CEO, Mr. Pichai,
suggests the corporate entities cannot keep up with the internet’s ever-evolving
nature.194 Since Congress is equally incapable of staying current, a new agency
with jurisdiction to enact cutting-edge policies regulating this new frontier of
media may be the best solution.195
A new federal agency could consolidate research and data across all social
media platforms to better determine where the issues lie and which solutions
work.196 Like the FTC has the authority to investigate business conduct and
practices, an internet agency would be privy to coding and algorithms.197 Then,
186. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS ON AB 35, at 6 (July 1, 2021).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Transcript: Hearing on Disinformation Nation, supra note 105.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See id. (“I would say the nature of content is so fast-changing and so dynamic, we spend a lot of
energy hiring experts, consult with third parties, and that expertise is needed.”).
195. Transcript: Hearing on Disinformation Nation, supra note 150; Heilweil, supra note 94; see John F.
Manning & Mathew C. Stephenson, Legislation and Regulation 29 (3d ed. 2017) (explaining how the legislative
process’ design is inefficient to prevent the hasty passing of “bad laws”).
196. Caroline Atkinson et al., Recommendations to the Biden Administration on Regulating Disinformation
and
Other
Harmful
Content
on
Social
Media,
HARV.
(Mar.
2021),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b6df958f8370af3217d4178/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review).
197. A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative, Law Enforcement, and
Rulemaking Authority, FTC (May 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
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public interest sectors could evaluate how safe social media mechanisms are for
the public.198 Additionally, a federal agency could use consolidated research to
assess and determine which content moderation policy is the most effective at
addressing false information.199
V. CONCLUSION
Assembly Member Chau made a gallant yet unfulfilling effort to propose
solutions to a national crisis.200 False information is devastating to society, and it
desperately needs a solution.201 AB 35 offers a solution with state-mandated social
media platform disclosures detailing what the platform does and does not do to
address false information.202 It does not require platforms to adopt a false
information policy, and the platforms will continue to self-regulate.203 However,
the solution proposed does not tackle the problem’s root cause.204 Misinformation
has infiltrated society because social media platforms are ineffectively managing
user-posted content.205 If self-regulation is the source of the issue, then solutions
must aim at ending self-regulation.206
Additionally, false information is a national problem; therefore, solutions must
come from a national level.207 Amending Section 230 to impose liability on online
platforms for user-posted content could help, but the platforms already struggle to
moderate these issues independently.208 Moreover, a privatized corporation will
continue putting profits over the public welfare if allowed.209 Self-regulation has
failed; it is time for a new federal agency to regulate the internet.210
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